papers in progress (or under review)

N.B.: I only update this every so often; it might be a little out-of-date.

On intuitive justifications in logic, classical logic, and consistency. What underlies the disagreement about validity between a classical and dialetheist logician? A prima facie natural answer is in terms of the intuitive justifications each offers for their preferred logic. Specifically, the classicist seems to take on a kind of commitment to consistency which the dialetheist does not. But trying to articulate what that commitment involves raises significant difficulties. I suggest that such an intuitive consistency commitment cannot do the job.

On überconsistent logics and dialetheism. Graham Priest suggests that ‘überconsistent’ logics with inconsistent logical truths provide a new argument for dialetheism. I argue that establishing such logics’ independent support for dialetheism is rather more difficult than it might first appear.

On inconsistent logics and the invalidity problem. An inconsistent logic finds some arguments both valid and invalid. I argue that endorsing an inconsistent logic results from central and widely-held dialetheist commitments. The main problem you face if you do endorse one is that the notion of in/validity can no longer distinguish ‘innocent’ inferences from ’trivialising’ inferences. I suggest that a different resource, ‘robustness’, seems to be up to the job.

On the (logical) global notion of metainferential validity. I argue that the global notion of validity can’t do as a notion of logical validity because, on pain of trivialising informative theories, it cannot embody the universality of logic. One can just about fix this, but the fix raises its own issues.

On the normativity of consequence, assertion, and dialetheism. I outline and try to solve a puzzle for the classical dialetheist: How can an explosive logic govern assertion and assertoric commitment when these are permitted to have inconsistent contents? I suggest that the trick is to relativise norms of assertoric commitment to distinct modes thereof. The puzzle is then addressed by adding an initially unexpected, but at the end of the day well-motivated, principle linking these modes of commitment to consequence.